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Assumptions Regarding Indians
and Judicial Humility:
Thoughts from a Property-Law Lens
Ezra Rosser

T

nothing of the case’s denial of Indian sovereign territorial
rights, has been rightly criticized by scholars. Just as the
Oliphant assumption that non-Indians would be harmed by
Indian courts is problematic, so too are assumptions regarding
how Indian land holdings impact neighboring non-Indians
and off-reservation communities.

wo Indians refuse to move until their complaints are
heard. Stoically they stand. Waiting. Eventually a staffer
promises them a meeting. This image of stoic and mostly
silent Indians formed a mini-drama on the TV-show The West
Wing. The treatment of Indian issues on HBO’s The Sopranos
was similarly curt: sitting out on the curb, mobsters complain
that Indians are getting stuff – from gambling – without having to work for it like Italian-Americans have had to. This
anger culminates in an attack on Indians protesting Columbus
Day. Largely missing from both stories are Indian voices;
instead, Indians are understood only as they relate to nonIndians. The same holds true for how the U.S. Supreme Court
understands Indians, or doesn’t understand them.
Awareness and understanding – real or assumed – of Indian
legal issues varies considerably by location. Non-Indians in
Arizona or New Mexico living near an Indian reservation have
a distinct set of experiences from, say, Connecticut residents
reading about the rise of Foxwoods Casino. And judges or justices living in large metropolises such as Washington, D.C.
may have to go far out of their way to learn a little bit about
the continent’s original inhabitants.1 Unfortunately, an assumption that Indians harm non-Indians can be found throughout
the relatively recent Indian-law jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The recent decision in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation
of New York2 attests to the power of this assumption of harm.
Briefly, Sherrill involved a tribe that, after buying up land within
its original reservation boundary, claimed the right not to pay
taxes on this property because through such purchases the tribe
had unified fee and aboriginal title. The Supreme Court disagreed and under an (un-briefed) laches theory ruled that too
much time had passed since the land had passed out of Oneida
hands for the tribe to assert such sovereignty. A secondary basis
for the decision was the idea that were the Oneida to be successful in reasserting sovereignty it would be disruptive and
harm the expectations of non-Indians in the area.
Indian-law academics have focused their ire on Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,3 which rejected tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Oliphant assumption that nonIndians would not be treated justly by tribal courts, to say

It comes as quite a shock for my first-year law students to
learn that they have to read an Indian-law case for their first
day of property law. Yet Johnson v. M’Intosh4 is the first case in
the two leading property-law textbooks – Krier et al. and
Singer.5 The second case, the first case for those for whom lawschool memories are more removed, is the tale of a dispute
between two fox hunters: Pierson v. Post.6 There are some professors who skip Johnson v. M’Intosh, either because it is too
complicated or they do not want to bother with the Doctrine
of Discovery or the fact of conquest. But in general only the
most conservative members of the faculty do not teach both
cases; since my primary field is Indian law, I follow the textbook order and the cases work well together.
My first year teaching, I walked up to the podium and
within 20 seconds asked one student, “What are the facts in
Johnson v. M’Intosh?” His startled reaction before getting to the
case: “Wow, that was fast.” This was the first type of push-back
I got from students reading about Indian rights to land, but by
no means the last. During a break the second time I taught
Johnson v. M’Intosh, a student came down to the podium quite
perturbed and declared that I “shouldn’t use the word Indian.”
I assured her that it was alright. Students at my school are
either too comfortable with the case – they enjoy finding the
racist language in the opinion and denounce students who
approach the case in a detached way – or they feel that they
have little they can contribute and seem to long for the impersonal esoteric rules of civil procedure from their first semester.
Johnson v. M’Intosh is a largely invented case. According to
the opinion it is a dispute between one party who acquired title
to land from an Indian tribe and another party whose title
traced back to a non-Indian sovereign. Chief Justice John
Marshall writes that because of the Doctrine of Discovery, a

Footnotes
1. Justices Breyer and O’Connor toured the Navajo Nation in 2001 and
while there praised the restorative aspects of the Navajo judicial
system. See Jim Maniaci, Judges Laud Navajo System: Peacemaker
Court Called Impressive, GALLUP INDEPENDENT, July 20, 2001.
2. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).

3. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
4. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
5. JAMES E. KRIER ET AL., PROPERTY (6th ed. 2006); JOSEPH WILLIAM
SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES (4th ed.
2006).
6. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
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racist doctrine under which European nations were said to
acquire sovereign authority over land they “discovered” without regard to the Indian tribes already living on the land, and
the fact of conquest, the party with Indian title must lose out
in such a dispute. But as Eric Kades proved, in fact there was
no real dispute – the land claims of the two parties never in fact
overlapped! The Court did not trouble itself with the minor
problem of a looking at whether there in fact was a real dispute, instead the case was decided and helped pave the way for
an efficient transfer of land from Indians to non-Indians.7
What students usually fail to pick up on is that Indian title
survived the ethnocentrism of Johnson v. M’Intosh.8 The party
who bought land directly from an Indian tribe rather than
acquiring it from the U.S. Government does have recourse,
albeit not recourse before a U.S. court, according to Chief Justice
Marshall: “The person who purchases lands from the Indians,
within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as
respects the property purchased; holds their title under their
protection, and subject to their laws.”9 The Court acknowledged
Indians as “the rightful occupants of the soil” while at the same
time arguing that Indian “rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished.”10
The second case involves a fox, two hunters, and hounds.
Lodowick Post and his hounds are chasing a fox (“poor reynard” as the fox is called in the dissent) when “Jesse Pierson
jumps out of nowhere and grabs the fox.”11 The question
before the court was whether through his pursuit alone Post
acquired a right to the fox sufficient to “sustain an action
against Pierson for killing and taking” the fox.12 The majority
opinion, written by Justice Tompkins, was that Post had no
right to the fox. For support, Tompkins looked to the writings
of, in his own language, various “ancient writers.”13 Post’s
claim was doomed because he had not “deprived the fox of his
natural liberty, and brought him within his certain control,”14
as Tompkins held was required by the sources he surveyed.
Tompkins concludes with a policy argument: that the rule
adopted will help preserve “peace and order in society” by limiting “quarrels and litigation.”15
But Justice Livingston’s dissent is a powerful one. He argues
that rather than relying upon the majority’s ancient writers, the
dispute “should have been submitted to the arbitration of
sportsmen.”16 Livingston calls into question the utility of hunting codes written “many hundred years ago,” and argues for
the right to “establish” a new rule given the time that has
passed.17 From an ancient writer, Livingston finds a distinction

between “large dogs and
Indian contact with
hounds” and mere “beagles,” a
non-Indians, or
distinction that beagle owners
may object to and which vice versa, invites
obscures the more powerful assumptions from
parts of the argument. Reading
both sides.
the dissent provides its share of
entertainment – the fox is
referred to as “poor reynard” whose memory “has not been
spared” – but Livingston’s main point is that a new rule might
be more efficient and better encourage the hunting of foxes.
Most students come to property law without much interest
in either the rights of Indians to land or fox hunting, and by
such metrics perhaps material on gated communities would be
a better place to start. But students soon begin to raise questions: Should the racism in Johnson v. M’Intosh be forgiven as a
product of its time? Did Marshall really believe in the assumptions underlying the Doctrine of Discovery or was he sufficiently apologetic about using the Doctrine? Perhaps because
the challenges of the decision are readily apparent to even those
encountering the case for the first time, it makes for a great way
to start Property law. But I have found that many students only
truly start questioning Johnson v. M’Intosh after they have read
Pierson v. Post. Livingston’s primary contribution to propertylaw courses is not that he distinguishes between hounds and
beagles, it is that he forces students to question judicial assumptions. Chief Justice Marshall’s voice in Johnson v. M’Intosh is just
too authoritative, but the back-and-forth of Pierson v. Post
brings out the need to think critically about the often unstated
assumptions and the descriptions of the world found in judicial
opinions.

7. Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and
the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065
(2000).
8. Professor Robert A. Williams, Jr. has been the leading scholar on
the nature and historical development of the eurocentricism of
federal Indian law. See, e.g., ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN
INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSE OF CONQUEST
(1990); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law:
The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s
Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219.
9. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 593 (1823).
10. Id. at 574.

11. Bethany Berger, It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold History of
Pierson v. Post, 55 DUKE L.J. 1089, 1091 (2006).
12. Pierson v. Post, 3 CAI. R. 175, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 178.
15. Id. at 179.
16. Id. at 180 (J. Livingston dissenting).
17. Id. at 181 (J. Livingston dissenting).
18. NEW MEXICO ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FARMINGTON REPORT: A CONFLICT OF CULTURES 1
(July 1975), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/
ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/35/64/c0.pdf.

CROSSING BOUNDARIES

Indian contact with non-Indians, or vice versa, invites
assumptions from both sides. Indians may assume that nonIndians are after their land or resources (perhaps a fair assumption) and non-Indians may assume that all Indians are casino
Indians or are alcoholic (frequent but unfair assumptions). The
places where contact is most frequent and perhaps most troublesome are often border towns, cities located just off-reservation whose consumer base includes a sizable number of reservation Indians.
In 1974, the bodies of three “beaten, tortured, and burned”
Navajo men were found in the canyon country near
Farmington, New Mexico.18 Three Anglo teenagers were
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charged with the murders.19
Sparked by the murders, the
New Mexico Advisory
Committee to the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights
held hearings in Farmington
and ultimately released its
report in July 1975. “It was
perhaps inevitable,” the Farmington Report notes, “that someday the presence of conflicting races, cultures, and value systems would lead to violence and confrontation.”20
By the 30th anniversary of the first report, when the advisory committee returned to check on how things had changed
in three decades, “it found significant progress in race relations
between Navajos and whites in Farmington.”21 And yet a year
after the second Farmington Report was released, three Anglo
teenagers picked up a 47-year-old Navajo hitchhiker and on
the outskirts of “the Selma, Ala., of the Southwest,” kicked,
punched, and beat him with a stick while using “racial slurs as
they pummeled him.”22 Things may have progressed since
1974, but there is still a ways to go in Farmington and in many
other border towns, from Gallup, New Mexico, to the City of
Sherrill, New York.
Recently, much has been asked of non-Indians living within
the original reservation boundary of the Oneida Indian Nation.
The success of Turning Stone Resort and Casino allowed the
Oneida Indian Nation of New York to buy up land within their
original reservation, and non-Indians were asked to respect the
right of the tribe to claim treaty-protected territory. When the
land claims of the Oneida threatened non-Indians, nonIndians balked. Without going into the details – the tribe faced
a bomb threat and repeated use of racially charged language –
it is safe to say that non-Indians suddenly realized and reacted
against the idea that an Indian nation could have an impact on
their lives or their property values.23
What should courts do when faced with a conflict involving
Indian and non-Indian contact? The last time that the U.S.
Supreme Court squarely took this on was in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes,24 a case involving the power of a tribe to
exercise zoning authority over its original reservation.
According to a plurality, the tribe could zone the “closed” portions of the reservation – areas with few non-Indians – but the
“open areas” of the reservation were a different story. Because
the tribe “no longer possesses the power to determine the basic
character” of an area that had become predominantly nonIndian in both ownership and population, the tribe could not
exercise its zoning regulatory power over the open area.25 The
decision only seems like a split decision until you realize that

by treaty the United States supposedly had guaranteed the tribe
“exclusive use and benefit” of the reservation.26 There is nothing new about the problem of line drawing, but one might have
hoped that the Court would have been more protective of
promises memorialized in treaties that purport to respect reservation boundaries.
Ex Ante it is hard to list all the possible disputes between
Indian and non-Indian neighbors or community members that
may end up before a court. Disputes have erupted over
whether non-Indian corporations should develop natural areas
that have religious or spiritual significance to area Indian
tribes. Similarly, whether stores on Indian land should be able
to sell gasoline or cigarettes without charging customers the
same taxes found off-reservation has been a hotly contested
issue. But the disputes can be more mundane: What powers
should state police officers have in checkerboard areas – areas
with alternating reservation and fee lands – within reservation
boundaries? What limits are there on the rights of a nonIndian bank to discriminate against Indian borrowers and what
courts get to hear such cases?
To illustrate the challenges even in a garden-variety dispute
involving two neighbors, one Indian, one non-Indian, I am
going to use a nuisance hypothetical. Suppose that the NonIndian, Bob Johnson, is your fairly typical white suburbanite.
He drives an oversized SUV, has a house surrounded by a sixfoot-tall privacy fence, and owns a full-bred yellow lab. The
city he lives in prohibits junk cars from being kept on the
lawns of residents and also has a noise ordinance for residential areas. Fortunately, Bob’s yellow lab cannot jump the privacy fence and therefore does not need to be kept chained up,
which keeps him happy and ensures he does not bark very
much. Moreover, Bob’s house has a three-car garage that
houses his SUV, an old junker, and his motorcycle, so he has
never been in violation of the city’s prohibition on visible junk
cars. Just beyond Bob Johnson’s fence is a section of tribal trust
land, on which Margarita Yellowhair has a single-wide trailer,
three dogs, a horse, and seven chickens. Margarita also owns
three dilapidated Ford F-150s. At any one time she can only
seem to keep one truck running and she tends to use the others – parked or on blocks in her front yard – as a source of
needed parts. Initially she let her dogs roam free, but after a
neighbor’s dog got pregnant from one of her dogs, she decided
to keep them on chains. Having once been free, her dogs bark
constantly in protest of the new arrangement.
Readers familiar with reservation life may rightly question
the above depiction of Bob and Margarita. The wealthy nonIndian, Bob, and less wealthy Indian, Margarita, are problematically stereotypical. Of course, if the hypothetical was based

19. Id. at 2.
20. Id. at 15.
21. NEW MEXICO ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FARMINGTON REPORT: CIVIL RIGHTS FOR NATIVE
AMERICANS 30 YEARS LATER 52 (Nov 2005), available at
http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/122705_FarmingtonReport.pdf.
22. Evelyn Nieves, “In Navajo Country, Racism Rides Again,”
SALON.COM, Sep. 2, 2006, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/
2006/09/02/navajo/.

23. For a more complete account of non-Indian reactions, see Ezra
Rosser, Protecting Non-Indians from Harm? The Property
Consequences of Indians, 87 ORE. L. REV. 175, 198-209 (2008).
24. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
25. Id. at 446.
26. Treaty of the United States and the Yakima Nation of Indians, Mar.
8, 1959, 12 Stat. 951 (1859).

What should courts
do when faced with
a conflict involving
Indian and nonIndian contact?
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on a casino tribe with high per capita payments in a poor community, the identities could be flipped. But it remains the case
that overall Indians on reservations are of a notably lower
socioeconomic class compared to the United States average.
Therefore, given the truth behind the stereotypes, perhaps
most apparent in border towns, I hope I will be forgiven for
relying upon stereotypes in the hypothetical.
But who is harming who? Property scholars developed the
infamous “box of four” out of one of the most influential lawreview articles of all time – Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed’s Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral27 – in part to answer this question.
Figure 1 is the box of four as it is often presented for nuisance
cases (Calabresi and Melamed rely heavily upon nuisance
examples):

According to this framework, Rule 1 means that the
Resident gets the initial entitlement (say to be free from pollution) and sets the price that he or she is willing to sell the entitlement to the Polluter. Rule 2 means the Resident gets the initial entitlement but the state, or a court, sets the price at which
the Resident must sell the entitlement (often called a damage
award). For Rule 3 and Rule 4, the Polluter gets the initial entitlement (say to pollute), and in Rule 3 the Polluter sets the
price and in Rule 4 the state sets the price.
Many non-lawyers, or those new to the law (such as students), instinctively equate “Resident” with “Good Actor” and
“Polluter” with “Bad Actor.” Some of the cases reinforce this
mental shortcut: A sympathetic homeowner is subjected to
smoke from a factory or to excessive noise from an apartment
building’s industrial strength air-conditioning unit. From the
perspective of the Resident, they are being harmed by the way
that the Polluter is using his or her land; however, from the
perspective of the Polluter, they are being harmed by the way
Resident is using his or her land. The Resident cannot use his
or her property as desired, say to peacefully look up upon the
night sky because of the Polluter’s use and similarly the
Polluter cannot freely pollute because of the competing desires
of the Resident. One way property law deals with this simultaneous benefit and harm is by limiting Resident claims when
the Polluter employs a large number of people in the community or when the Resident “comes to the nuisance.”

The first challenge when
Property scholars
thinking about the conflictdeveloped the
ing land-use decisions of
Bob and Margarita is to figinfamous “box of
ure out who is the four” out of one of
“Polluter.” Ultimately, it is a
matter of perspective. Most the most influential
Americans probably instinc- law review articles
tively will view Margarita – of all time... in part
with her junk cars and barkto answer this
ing dogs – as the “Polluter.”
question.
When the city’s zoning rules
are included it seems almost
self-evident that Margarita is the “Bad Actor.” Such a judgment
arguably reflects middle-class values, and perhaps non-Indian
ones as well, more than a meaningful distinction between Bob
and Margarita’s actions. If Bob and Margarita live in an open
area where most people do not wall off their homes, then Bob’s
privacy fence could well be viewed as an eyesore breaking up
the view Margarita can enjoy. And in poorer communities or in
areas where most lots are spaced far apart, broken down cars
may be viewed as normal rather than something that a neighbor could be upset about. Even expectations about the noise
from barking dogs can reflect class-based biases. Bob and
Margarita are, therefore, both the Resident and the Polluter.
One way to solve the question of who is being harmed
would be to apply the “coming to the nuisance” idea. In a dispute involving Indian and non-Indian land-use decisions, nonIndians, including Bob, arguably “came to the nuisance,” in
that Indians were the initial occupiers of the continent. This
solution has the advantage that it is simple – Indians are always
right – but it is not reflective of values all but the most strident
Indian advocate would have. Even if the dispossession of
Indians was accomplished through manifest destiny – arguably
genocidal – policies, often with the imprimatur of legality, the
“newcomers” surely have obtained rights with time.28 So we
must be careful not to take the “coming to the nuisance” argument too far.
One way to appropriately limit its power would be to take
seriously reservation boundaries. The expectations of nonIndians who live inside original reservation boundaries – the
boundaries that are memorialized through treaty or executive
orders, not the boundaries post-allotment – should not be the
same as they might be if they lived off-reservation. To put it
back in terms of Bob and Margarita’s land-use conflicts: If Bob’s
land is located within the boundaries of a reservation, then he
should not expect Margarita to hide her cars and Margarita
should have a greater right regarding her unobstructed view.
The challenge is what to do when the boundary between Bob
and Margarita is also the reservation boundary. I submit that in
such a case both parties should have little recourse regarding
their neighbor’s choices.
The law tolerates all sorts of boundaries, even arbitrary or
inefficient ones. The town of Crater Lake, Iowa, is a great case

27. 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
28. See also Joseph William Singer, Nine-Tenths of the Law: Title,
Possession & Sacred Obligations, 38 CONN. L. REV. 605, 611 (2006)

(noting that in Sherrill “the Supreme Court appears to have given
whole-hearted support for what I have called the “reliance interest in property””).

FIGURE 1: CALABRESI & MELAMED BOX OF FOUR
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in point. As the New York
Times reported, Crater Lake
is a little “nub” of land that
into
Omaha,
juts
Nebraska.29 The Missouri
River made an oxbow curve
around Crater Lake, making
the land connect with Iowa;
that is until 1877 when the
river changed course, cutting off the oxbow and leaving Crater
Lake, Iowa, stranded in Nebraska!30 In a more familiar example, in 1922 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Village of
Euclid, Ohio’s authority to limit industrial expansion using its
zoning authority even though Euclid was fast becoming a suburb of Cleveland.31 Though the Court left open the future possibility that “general public interest” might at some point “far
outweigh the interest of the municipality” in determining
municipal development through zoning, the Court upheld
Euclid’s “authority to govern itself as it sees fit.”32
Indian nations should also have the ability to govern reservations as they see fit, but there will be challenges. The U.S.
Supreme Court has limited tribal authority over non-Indians in
several important respects: first by curtailing criminal jurisdiction and more recently by limiting tribal authority in the civil
context. But it is important that assumptions regarding the
nature of tribal governance or the nature of Indian land not
form the basis for further limitations on tribal sovereignty.
Non-Indians may believe any number of things about how
Indian sovereignty or the reservation status of nearby land
harms them, but it is important to distinguish between nonIndian assumptions and demonstrated harm.
In the tribal court context, many non-Indians assume that
non-Indians cannot get a fair hearing before a tribal court. This
assumption, shared by many non-Indian judges, can form the
basis for denying tribes’ jurisdiction over non-Indians that
tribes would have if jurisdiction was determined, as it is in the
state context, by geographic boundaries. As with most assumptions, it has an intuitive basis: non-Indians might be nervous
for example that an Indian jury might not be a jury of their
peers or they might fear that Indians might have justifiable
prejudice against non-Indians. Yet, as Professor Bethany
Berger’s research shows, the treatment of non-Indians who
appear before Navajo Nation courts is “remarkably balanced,”
both in terms of their win-loss ratios and in qualitative terms.33
While the assumption may seem reasonable at first blush, there
is no proof that it is accurate.
Another assumption non-Indians may make is that it is
“bad” to live next to an Indian reservation or have Indian

neighbors. The research I am currently working on explores
one aspect of this assumption, using tax data from upstate
New York to test if non-Indian property values are negatively
affected by proximity to Indian land. The research was
inspired by the U.S. Supreme Court’s unexplored assumption
of harm to non-Indians in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian
Nation of New York.34 The challenges exploring this harm
reveal the assumptive nature of the Court’s claimed harm to
non-Indians. Lawyers are generally not comfortable with
Geographical Information Systems programming or with statistical data analysis, so to do the exploration, I had to find coauthors with such expertise. Even having assembled people
with the expertise needed, the answer to whether non-Indians
are harmed has not jumped out of the analysis; therefore, our
work continues. These challenges suggest two important
things: (1) the assumption of harm may well not be accurate,
at least as it relates to non-Indian property values, and (2) the
Court did not adequately investigate its assumption of harm
before the assumption was used as a reason to limit tribal
sovereignty.
There is much that can be said in defense of the Court’s
assumption of harm, but it is important to notice that it is in
fact an assumption. The same can be said of Justice Tompkins’s
majority opinion in Pierson v. Post – there may in fact be good
reasons that pursuit alone should not give a hunter a right to
the fox, but assumptions relied upon should be acknowledged.
Doing so may inspire a little judicial humility.

29. William Robbins, “Standing by a Capricious Neighbor,” N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 1988, at 18.
30. Id.
31. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
32. Id. at 389-90. Fifty years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court
famously overrode a municipality’s exclusionary zoning outside of
Camden and Philadelphia in support of the general public interest in affordable housing. Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P.
v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975).

33. Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over
Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047, 1047
(2006).
34. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
35. Perez v. Sharp, 32 CAL. 2D 711 (1948); Loving v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). For commentary on these cases and
antimiscegenation laws, see RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL
INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 259-80 (2003).

Humility is required
when courts are
asked to weigh in
on disputes
between Indians
and non-Indians.
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HUMILITY AND COURTS

Humility is required when courts are asked to weigh in on
disputes between Indians and non-Indians. Why humility?
Because decisions should not be based upon stereotypes of
Indians or assumptions, based on limited experiences or anecdotal evidence, regarding how Indians affect non-Indians. The
good news is that state courts and lower federal courts could
play a leading role in this. The U.S. Supreme Court has been
fairly unconcerned with learning what life on a reservation is
like, or even with mastering the precedent applicable to
Indian-law cases. State court, and to some degree lower federal
court, judges, especially judges in states with larger Indian
populations, have the ability to help set a new course for
Indian/non-Indian relations, one that rejects the American
legacy of colonialism rather than embraces it.
State courts have in the past recognized the right thing to do
well before the U.S. Supreme Court. The California Supreme
Court invalidated a state antimiscegenation law in 1948, nineteen years before the United States Supreme Court caught up
in Loving v. Virginia.35 And as noted in its recent unanimous

decision on gay marriage, the Iowa Supreme Court struck
blows against slavery and segregation “long before” the United
States Supreme Court.36 Beating the U.S. Supreme Court to recognize a right might seem anything but an example of humility, but in cases involving Indian tribes, the right thing to do is
the recognition of existing rights rather than the creation of
new rights. Any time that a non-Indian court considers an
Indian/non-Indian dispute, the resulting opinion has the
potential to limit the authority of sovereigns whose societies
pre-date the War of Independence and the U.S. Constitution.
The decisions of the Rehnquist Court, and now the Roberts
Court, with few exceptions have taken away the sovereignty of
tribes when such sovereignty impacts non-Indians. State
courts need not dogmatically follow this trend. Humility – here
I mean recognition that sovereign nations, even nations
located entirely within the United States, should not have their
powers stripped lightly – regarding the role the judiciary
should play when courts hear disputes involving the powers of
tribal nations, would seem to require affording greater respect
to tribal sovereignty and greater deference to tribal decisions
on how to govern reservations.
If you surveyed Indian-law professors about where the U.S.
Supreme Court has made the biggest mistake or caused the
most problems in the field, I suspect that the leading contender would be Oliphant, though more radical scholars might
highlight Johnson v. M’Intosh. But I am particularly troubled
and disheartened by the mistaken assumptions and arrogance
of Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley.37 In a unanimous decision
the Court invalidated the Navajo Nation’s 8% hotel-occupancy
tax after the tax was challenged by Atkinson Trading
Company, the owners of Cameron Trading Post. The Court
held that the tax did not fit within either of the Montana
exceptions. In Montana v. United States,38 the Court limited
civil authority of tribes over nonmembers as a general matter,
but provided two exceptions. The first is that tribes can regulate “the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members.”39 The second exception is that tribes “may exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
the conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare
of the tribe.”40 The Atkinson Court quickly rejected application of either exception, holding that Cameron Trading Post
had not met the consent test – for if there was in this case “the
exception would swallow the rule” – nor did it have a large
enough direct effect.41
Looking out from the chambers of the Supreme Court this
might make sense – how important can a hotel or trading post
really be after all? But from the Navajo Nation, and perhaps
from anywhere in rural parts of the southwest, it is out of
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such
areas.
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Indians and nonWashington, D.C., there may
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always get along;
but on the Navajo Nation the
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scattered trading posts play a
critical role in the economic
that such
and social life of tribal memdisagreements
bers. Moreover, as the Court
not become cause
acknowledges in the opinfor destroying
ion, trading posts are connected to the tribe through a
tribal sovereignty.
web of relationships and
interdependencies; to allow the trading-post owners to pretend
that they should not have to contribute to area governance that
they benefit from makes the two exceptions virtually meaningless.42 The Atkinson decision is based on the assumption that a
hotel or trading post means the same in northern Arizona, on
the Navajo Nation, as it does in wealthier, more densely populated, non-Indian parts of the country. The Court could have
been more humble before it stripped the Navajo Nation of one
of the central government powers, taxation; it could have
required more of Atkinson Trading Company than simply
showing that Cameron Trading Post was located on fee land.
The U.S. executive branch attorneys, while not using the language of humility, joined the tribe in urging the Court to appreciate the unique role that traders play on reservations and leave
in place the Navajo Nation’s power to impose this tax.43 The
Court balked.
Like all neighbors, Indians and non-Indians will not always
get along; yet it is important that such disagreements not
become cause for destroying tribal sovereignty. The parties
involved mean that many cases will end up in the federal court
system, but not all will reach the Supreme Court, and some will
be heard by state court judges. At a recent and rare public
appearance, Justice Thomas stated:
I’m very very reluctant to, to have a strong opinion on
something without having briefs or opinions to read and
think through. It slows you down because, you know
this job is easy for people who’ve never done it. [laughter, clapping] And what I have found in this job is that
they know more about it than I do, especially if they have
the title “law professor.”44

36. Varnum v. Brien, 2009 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 31, at 24, available at
http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/wfData/files/Varnum/07-1499.pdf.
37. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
38. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
39. Id. at 565.
40. Id. at 566.
41. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 655-57 (2001).

42. The reverse of the justices’ fears is true: the rule has swallowed the
exceptions!
43. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 656 (2001).
44. Justice Clarence Thomas, “Keynote Address,” Bill of Rights
Institute’s Being an American Awards Gala, Mar. 31, 2009, transcript available at http://www.beinganamerican.org/files/
essays/thomas_keynote.pdf.

Justice Thomas’s stated reluctance to have a strong opinion
about a controversy without having first read and thought
about it is a step in the right direction. Hopefully, judges closer
to reservation life will be able to add a local understanding and
a skepticism regarding what is “known” about Indian tribes and
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reservations to this reluctant stance. Professor Jeffrey Rosen
writes, “Humility, ultimately, is a character trait as well as a
judicial disposition. It describes the spirit, as Judge Hand put
it, ‘which is not too sure that it is right.’”45 As a term “judicial
humility” seems loaded, a rhetorical tool of (conservative)
court commentators to decry activist judges. I do not mean to
employ “judicial humility” in that way. Rather, judicial humility as it relates to disputes involving Indian tribes counsels for
caution regarding what is “known” about Indian nations.
Cursory treatment of Indian issues in shows like The West
Wing and The Sopranos should not be mirrored by equally shallow judicial assumptions regarding how Indians affect neighboring non-Indians.
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45. Jeffrey Rosen, The Supreme Court: Judicial Temperament and the
Democratic Ideal, 47 WASHBURN L. J. 1, 10 (2007) (quoting from
LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 190 (1953)). See also Paul L.
Caron & Rafael Gely, “A Need for Judicial Humility,” NATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL, Nov. 24, 2003 (“Judicial humility is neither liberal
nor conservative. It recognizes that judges and lawyers hold no
monopoly on wisdom . . .”).

NOTICE FOR AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION MEMBERS

The newsletter of the American Judges Association, Benchmark, has been moved from print to
electronic publication. If we have your email address on file, we will send Benchmark to you each
time it is published. Benchmark is the official newsletter of the AJA, and it contains notice of AJA
activities, elections, awards, and events. This move will help us make sure that you get timely notice
of AJA information, and it will also help us in keeping AJA dues as low as possible.
You will continue to receive Court Review in the mail.
If you haven’t provided your email address to the AJA, please send it to us at
aja@ncsc.dni.us. We will use it only for authorized correspondence from the AJA.

46 Court Review - Volume 45

